

COMMENTARY

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Next stop on the NWO express?

Wishers vs. realists

In Foreign Affairs magazine in 1974, diplomat Richard Gardner offered his fellow globalists advice on how to bring Americans around to embracing world government. It would have to be done, he wrote, by stealth: "[T]he house of world order will have to be built from the bottom up ... an end run around national sovereignty, eroding it piece by piece, will accomplish much more than the old-fashioned frontal assault."

Mr. Gardner, now Bill Clinton's envoy to Spain, knew his countrymen would never knowingly surrender national independence. But he also knew they would accept noble-sounding treaties that seemed to promise greater security. Using Mr. Gardner's strategy, Mr. Clinton is about to march America yet another furlong into the New World Order.

Mr. Clinton's vehicle: the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Use of chemical weapons in warfare is already outlawed by the Geneva Convention. But the CWC would require a halt to production of such weapons and destruction of all existing arsenals. Americans who have read of the horrors of the Western Front of 1917-18 and of mustard gas and phosgene killing, blinding and disabling Doughboys for life will ask: Who in heaven's name can oppose such a treaty?

Answer: four U.S. secretaries of defense, James Schlesinger, Donald Rumsfeld, Casper Weinberger and Dick Cheney.

What is wrong with the CWC? First, the treaty is unverifiable and unenforceable. Rogue regimes like Iraq, which used chemical weapons on Iran and its own Kurdish subjects, and Libya, which is building a huge chemical weapons plant deep in a desert mountain, will never abide by its terms. The Russians have huge arsenals of such weapons, and there is no way of verifying all would be destroyed. As the price of ratification, though, Russia will surely insist that the Americans pay the cost of destroying those weapons they wish to get rid of. As for China, does anyone believe Beijing will be deterred from testing or developing such weapons by some piece of paper signed at the United Nations?

How does one enforce such a treaty, when inspectors crawling all over Iraq have been unable to do so and when the Japanese cult that produced the sarin poison gas used on a Tokyo subway train did so in a room about the size of the Montana cabin of the alleged Unabomber?

Under the treaty, thousands of U.S. factories that use chemicals must be opened, on challenge, to inspections by agents of a new UN authority to be established primarily with U.S. tax dollars. The risks of industrial and military espionage are huge. Any requirement that U.S. civilian industry open its doors to foreign inspectors with UN badges is an insult to the Constitution and an affront to sovereignty.

America is not some outlaw country or defeated nation.

Under Article 11 of the treaty, America must share technology with all signatory nations. This provision could force the transfer to potential enemies of technology we have developed to protect U.S. troops and could open the door to sales to our enemies of "dual use" chemicals that can be employed for peace or war.

The CWC will not make America more secure. It will just make us feel more secure. Like all the other foolish arms-control treaties of the 20th century — from the Washington Naval Agreement of 1922, to the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which outlawed war as an instrument of national policy, to SALT I




Illustration by Richard Mitholland/LA Times Syndicate

and the ABM treaties of Richard Nixon — it will be circumvented and cheated upon. Invariably, all these treaties tied the hands of democratic nations that believed in a rule of law and were exploited by dictators seeking strategic advantage at the expense of its future enemies in the West.

There is another reason the CWC should be repudiated. It is but the first in a long list of such treaties now being dreamed up to give the United Nations permanent authority to interfere in America's internal affairs — in the name of arms

control and disarmament. At the end of this road lies a global regime: the United Nations as world policeman with a permanent warrant to enter any country, at any time, to search for contraband weapons. The time to stop this is now.

As in the great Panama Canal debate of the late '70s, Senate Republicans are divided. Then, Minority Leader Howard Baker led a host of his colleagues to back Jimmy Carter and begin transferring the canal to the corrupt regime of Omar Torrijos and his deputy, Manuel Noriega. Ronald Reagan led

the opposition but lost the battle.

Today, one reads that the last U.S. base in Panama is to be shut down by Panama's left-wing regime, which has just leased the ports at either end of Teddy Roosevelt's "Big Ditch" to companies with ties to the Communist Chinese.

The vote on CWC will tell us if Reaganism is dead in the GOP Senate and collaboration with the left is back in style.

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Just because the Cold War is over does not mean the great divide in foreign-policy thinking has vanished — the one between wishful thinkers and realists.

Oh, that's not the way the wishful thinkers would put it. They'd say they are the party against (pick one or more) (1) war, (2) nuclear holocaust, and (3) chemical and biological weapons. The hopes of the wishful thinkers have a history of being codified in lovely sounding international treaties. The current incarnation is the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Chemical and biological weapons are horrifying and vile. But the question the U.S. Senate must ask as it considers whether to ratify the treaty is this: Will a piece of paper and one more United Nations bureaucracy really make the United States or the world any safer from the threat of these weapons?

The answer, regrettably, is no. The real world answer to fear is reason, not a feel-good treaty that could make things worse. Reason told us that only deterrence, not treaties (and there were many), kept us safe from nuclear attack during the Cold War. Deterrence keeps us safe still, which is why we are not dismantling our nuclear arsenal.

Deterrence is the only answer to the chemical and biological threat, as well (along with any defensive technology we can devise; but that's part of deterrence).

It was deterrence, not the 1925 Geneva Convention outlawing chemical weapons, that prevented Adolf Hitler from using poison gas in World War II. Remember the pictures of Londoners in the Underground during the early days of the war? They were all equipped with gas masks. Treaty or no, both sides were fully armed with poison and the defensive technologies of masks and uniforms. The treaty was ignored, but the balance of terror ruled.

How would we verify compliance with the CWC? Impossible. Chemical weapons are called the "poor country's nuclear weapons" because they are so cheap and easy to manufacture. The sarin gas that killed so many on the Tokyo subway was made in one small room. Two of the worst chemical agents, phosgene and hydrogen cyanide — both of which were used to devastating effect in World War I — are not banned by the treaty. Why? Because they are simply too commonly used for commercial purposes.

And speaking of common use, the Clinton administration has already announced that its understanding of the treaty precludes the use of tear gas and other riot-control agents in wartime, and during search-and-rescue operations, and when combatants and noncombatants are intermingled.

Under the terms of the treaty, once a violation is spotted, the offending country is given five days notice to prepare for inspection by an international team. Under a far more onerous regime than that, imposed by the United Nations after the Gulf war, Iraq has continued its chemical weapons program.

While international inspections would do nothing to impede treaty violators, they would impose huge costs on lawful countries like ours. The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency estimates that 3,000 American companies, ranging from Pfizer to Quaker Oats, would have to file detailed reports with the Commerce Department about their activities. They would also be subject to warrantless searches by international teams that might contravene the U.S. Constitution and would certainly provide a golden opportunity for

provide a golden opportunity for industrial espionage.

Further, under Article X, all signatories to the treaty are required to share chemical defensive technology and equipment to other signatories. We would then be obliged, at the risk of being seen as lawless, to provide Iran (which has already signed the treaty) with our defensive technology. In effect, we will be aiding Iran's chemical war-fighting capability. This is not a speculative risk. Iran used chemical weapons as recently as the 1980s in its war with Iraq.

This is worse than naivete; this is dangerous. Some of the world's worst offenders in the chemical warfare business — Iraq, Libya, North Korea and Syria — will not even sign the treaty. Those who do will find their treasuries (it will cost U.S. taxpayers about \$66 million a year for the U.N. bureaucracy alone) and their companies raided. And they will find their security compromised by requirements to share vital technology.

Surely, if the history of the 20th century teaches anything, it is to expect evil and meet it with force — not flimsy paper.

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